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STUDY OF THE ROLE OF PREPARERS IN RELATION TO TAXPAYER 
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS 
 
Leslie Book∗ 
  
I. Introduction 
 
The use of paid tax return preparers has grown steadily.1  Recent estimates indicate 
that 65 percent of all individuals use some type of paid tax return preparer.2  No formal 
requirements or educational background are needed to either prepare a return or offer 
advice in connection with the preparation of a tax return, and there are many types of 
tax return preparers.3  Recent estimates indicate that there are around 1.2 million 
preparers, many of whom are accountants, attorneys, or enrolled agents (EAs), that is 
practitioners who are subject to their respective professions’ standards for 
professionalism and conduct.4  Other preparers have no connection to formal 
professions, and are thus not subject to the professional standards for conduct or 
Treasury Circular 230’s potential disciplinary proceedings for misconduct.5  Many of 
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1
 See Michael Albert, Kim Bloomquist & Ron Edgerton, Evaluating Preparation Accuracy of Tax 
Practitioners: A Bootstrap Approach, 2007 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 1 (2007).  From 1996 to 
2005, the number of individual income tax returns prepared by paid practitioners increased from 63 
million to 80 million.  The total number of tax returns prepared by paid preparers rose to 74 percent of 
total reported taxes.  “This trend indicates the growing dependency of our nation’s tax system on the tax 
preparation industry and it underscores the need for the Internal Revenue Service to better understand 
how commercial tax preparation influences reporting behavior.”  Id.  
2
 Michael Albert, Kim Bloomquist & Ron Edgerton, Evaluating Preparation Accuracy of Tax Practitioners: 
A Bootstrap Approach, 2007 IRS RESEARCH CONFERENCE 1 (2007).   
3
 IRC § 7701(a)(36).  The Internal Revenue Code defines an income tax return preparer as “any person 
who prepares for compensation, or who employs one or more persons to prepare for compensation, any 
return of tax imposed by subtitle A or any claim for refund of tax imposed by subtitle A.  For purposes of 
the preceding sentence, the preparation of a substantial portion of a return or claim for refund shall be 
treated as if it were the preparation of such return or claim for refund.”  Id.   
4
 These categories of practitioners are all generally subject to examination, continuing education and 
ethics requirements. See National Taxpayer Advocate 2002 Annual Report 219-20; AICPA Code of 
Professional Conduct available at http://www.aicpa.org/about/code/index.htm (2006) (giving standards of 
conduct for all CPAs); ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct available at 
http://abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html (giving standards of conduct for all attorneys). 
5
 See 31 CFR §§ 10.1-10.93 (2005) (reproduced in Circular 230).  Treasury Circular 230 sets forth 
standards for tax practice and establishes a series of potential disciplinary actions against those 
practitioners who violate those standards.  See Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, The 
Office of Professional Responsibility Can Do More to Effectively Identify and Act Against Incompetent and 
Disreputable Tax Practitioners, No. 2006-10-066 (March 2006).  The IRS is aware of approximately 
800,000 people who are unenrolled tax preparers. Employees of large national return preparation chains 
undergo some training are subject to internal qualify reviews.  Some of these employees are subject to 
Treasury Circular 230 due to their status as CPAs, enrolled agents, or attorneys.  See Robert 
Weinberger, Comments on Treasury/IRS Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Modifying Regulations to 
Circular 230 Standards of Practice Before the Internal Revenue Service, 2007 TNT 215-35 (Nov. 6, 2007) 
(stating that approximately five percent of HR Block’s practitioners are “licensed under Circular 230”).  
Currently, California and Oregon are the only two states requiring enrollment and certification of all tax 
2 
 2 
those preparers file fewer than ten tax returns, and it seems likely that a large 
percentage of those preparers are employed in other activities and are unlikely to have 
significant experience or exposure to substantive tax law.6  All paid return preparers, 
including those who are not regulated by any licensing entity or subject to competency 
or continuing education requirements, must comply with certain requirements in 
connection with the preparation of a tax return, including signing the return7 and 
providing a copy of the return to taxpayers.8  Preparers are also subject to civil9 and 
                                                                                                                                                             
preparers.  See Oregon Board of Tax Practitioners, http://egov.oregon.gov/OTPB/about_us.shtml.(last 
visited Oct. 4, 2007); Certification and Licensing Requirements, 
http://egov.oregon.gov/OTPB/Certification_and_licensing_requirements.shtml; (California Tax Preparer 
Code of Conduct, http://www.ctec.org/index.asp?pid=7 (presenting California’s Code of Conduct for Tax 
Preparers which requires registration for a “person who,for a fee or other consideration, assists with or 
prepares tax returns”).  While the states’ requirements and obligations differ in both California and Oregon 
there is an exception for CPAs who hold a valid license from the State Board of Accountancy and 
attorneys who are active members of their respective state Bar Associations.  In California, there is also 
an exception for enrolled agents who are enrolled to practice before the IRS.  For a summary of the 
requirements necessary to become an enrolled agent. See Enrolled Agent Information, IRS Website, 
http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/agents/article/0,,id=100710,00.html. There have been legislative proposals to 
impose federal regulation of return preparers.  See e.g., S. 882, The Tax Administration Good 
Government Act (based on recommendations made by the National Taxpayer Advocate in her 2002 
Annual Report to Congress at 216-230). 
6
 National Taxpayer Advocate 2002 Annual Report to Congress 225 (looking at IRS 1999 filing year data). 
7
 IRC § 6695(b) (imposing penalties on tax preparers who do not sign returns).  The Temp. Regs. Sec. 
1.6695-1T(b) also requires that a return preparer sign each return he or she prepares after completing it 
and before presenting it to the taxpayer.  In Notice 2004-54, the IRS authorizes return preparers to sign 
original returns, amended returns, and extension requests by rubber stamp, mechanical device or 
computer software program. These signing methods must include either a facsimile of the preparer's 
signature or his or her printed name. Return preparers using one of these alternative means are 
personally responsible for affixing their signatures to returns or extension requests. If they use an 
alternative signing method, they must provide all of the other preparer information required on returns and 
extensions, such as (1) name, address and relevant employer identification number (EIN), (2) individual 
ID number (Social Security number or preparer tax ID number) and (3) telephone phone number.  For an 
overview of return preparer standards see Terri Guiterrez, Return Preparer Penalties: A Comprehensive 
Review, The CPA Journal; available at 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2001/0600/features/f063401.htm. 
8
 IRC § 6107(b) (requiring furnishing copy of tax return to taxpayer). 
9
 A summary of some of the applicable penalties follows: 
 
Code Section (§) Description Penalty 
6694(a) Understatement of taxpayer’s liability due 
to an unrealistic position (unrealistic 
position redefined in 2007) 
An amount equal to the 
greater of: a) $1,000 or 50% of 
the income derived (or to be 
derived) 
6694(b) Understatement of taxpayer’s liability due 
to willful or reckless conduct (willful or 
reckless conduct redefined in 2007) 
An amount equal to the 
greater of: a) $5,000 or 50% of 
the income derived (or to be 
derived) 
6695(a) Failure to provide a copy of return to 
taxpayer 
$50 per failure 
6695(b) Failure to sign return $50 per failure 
6695(c) Failure to furnish identifying number $50 per failure 
6695(d) Failure to retain a copy or list of returns 
filed 
$50 per failure 
3 
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even criminal10 penalties for improper conduct and the Code provides that the United 
States may bring a civil action to enjoin tax preparers if preparers engage in certain 
types of impermissible conduct.11 
 
Practitioners of all types can alleviate barriers to compliance, including computational 
difficulty and legal complexity.  They can help ensure that taxpayers take advantage of 
benefits administered through the tax system, such as the earned income tax credit 
(EITC), and help the government with its objective of increasing electronic filing.12  Yet, 
they also can contribute to taxpayers failing to comply with the internal revenue laws in 
a number of ways, including actively facilitating taxpayer intentional misconduct, failing 
to apply the law to a client’s circumstances, misunderstanding the law (including 
overstating a taxpayer’s liability), or failing to obtain relevant facts from clients. 
                                                                                                                                                             
6695(e) Failure of employers to file correct 
information on each tax preparer 
employed 
$50 per failure 
6695(f) Negotiation of taxpayer’s refund check $500 per check 
6695(g) Failure to be diligent in determining 
earned income tax credit eligibility 
$100 per failure 
6701 Aiding and abetting understatement of tax 
liability 
$1,000 
6713 Improper disclosure or use of return 
information 
$250 per disclosure up to a 
maximum of $10,000 
7206 Willful preparation of false or fraudulent 
return or other document 
Up to $100,000, 3 years 
imprisonment, or both 
7207 Knowingly providing fraudulent returns or 
other documents to IRS 
Up to $10,000, 1 year 
imprisonment, or both 
7216 Knowingly or recklessly disclosing or using 
return information 
Up to $1,000, 1 year 
imprisonment, or both 
7407 Authority to enjoin income tax preparers* 
 
* For a summary of the IRS’s current civil and criminal legal actions against preparers, see Tax Return 
Preparer Fraud, (Jan. 2007) available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=167391,00.html. 
10
 See e.g. IRC §§ 7201, 7206, 7207 and 7216.  Return preparers can be subject to criminal penalties for 
fraudulently preparing returns or other documents.  The possible deterrent effect of criminal sanctions 
against preparers is limited by the difficulty associated with establishing the proof of mental state of the 
preparer, i.e., that the preparer knew the return was false as filed.  Stuart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, 
Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses Tax Evasion Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, 5TH 
INT’L CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMIN. 164 (2002). 
11
 In April of 2007, Jackson Hewitt franchisees were served injunction suits in four different states.  The 
complaints in the injunction suits can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv07215.htm; United States 
v. Smart Tax Inc., No. 07C-1802 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2007); United States v. Smart Tax of Georgia Inc., No. 
07CV-0747 (N.D. Ga Apr. 2, 2007); United States v. Smart Tax of North Carolina, No. 5:07-cv-00125-FL 
(E.D. N.C. Apr. 2, 2007); United States v. So Far Inc., No. 2:07-cv-11470 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007). The 
cases were recently settled.  See Department of Justice, Corporations That Owned Jackson Hewitt 
Franchises in Three States Agree to Be Barred From Tax Return Preparation, (September 28,2007), 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_tax_779.html. 
12
 See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Tax Administration: Most Taxpayers Believe They Benefit from 
Paid Tax Preparers, But Oversight For IRS is a Challenge 7-8, GAO-04-70 (2003); Lin Mei Tan, Research 
on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpayer Compliance: Identifying Some of the Gaps, TAXATION 
ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (2006).  Electronic filing significantly reduces IRS 
processing costs.  See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Most Filing Season Services Continue to 
Improve, But Opportunities Exist for Additional Savings 7, GAO-07-27 (2006). 
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As discussed in this article, the research to date regarding how paid preparers affect tax 
compliance is inconclusive.  Some research suggests that practitioners can use their 
expertise to exploit legal ambiguities.13  Research also suggests that practitioners in 
effect play a dual role; that is they serve to exploit ambiguity, but also tend to serve as 
enforcers of the law when the law is relatively clear.14  Reflecting, in part, this research, 
policymakers and academics alike have emphasized practitioners’ role in 
noncompliance when there is the opportunity to take advantage of legally ambiguous 
issues.  For example, in Markets in Vice Markets in Virtue, interviewing advisors in New 
York and Australia, John Braithwaite studied the rapid growth in tax shelters in the late 
20th century.  Braithwaite’s study emphasized the role that tax advisors have played in 
the growth of tax shelters, and noted the contagion effect that supply-driven shelter 
advice can have on taxpayer norms15 and expectations.16  Likewise, in proposing 
solutions to compliance problems, many commentators have emphasized the 
practitioners’ role in connection with positions characterized by legal ambiguity.17  
 
Much of the compliance literature and a great deal of governmental efforts directed at 
return preparers are aimed at tempering practitioner’s appetites for exploiting ambiguity.  
For example, Eric Toder notes that much of “the popular perception of the tax gap 
comes from articles and books that publicize how corporations and wealthy individual 
taxpayers use highly-paid tax lawyers and accountants to devise sophisticated schemes 
to reduce their tax liability to a small fraction of their economic income.”18  
Notwithstanding the importance of understanding and reducing the gap that is 
associated with practitioners’ role in exploiting ambiguities, a significant amount of the 
tax gap relates to items that are not characterized by legal ambiguities.  The tax gap 
data shows that a large portion of the underpayment rate relates to issues where there 
is not the same opportunity for creative tax advice to exploit ambiguities through 
engineering artificial losses or deferring the receipt of income.19  Changing the penalty 
                                                 
13
 See Steven Klepper, Mark Mazur and Daniel Nagin, Expert Intermediaries and Legal Compliance: The 
case of tax preparers, 34 Journal of Law and Economics 205 (1991).  
14
 See Id. 
15
 For further discussion of tax norms in areas where advisors can exploit ambiguity or take advantage of 
literal interpretations to achieve large tax benefits, see Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: The Tax 
Effects of Tacit Understandings, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 601 (2007) (discussing, for example, the hedging 
strategy of variable delivery prepaid forward contracts) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=939174.  Raskolnikov has also discussed the 
manner in which the penalty regime might better influence advisors and taxpayers, especially in areas of 
legal complexity and ambiguity. Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and Punishment in Taxation, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
569 (2006). 
16
 John Braithwaite, MARKETS IN VICE MARKETS IN VIRTUE (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (2005).  
17
  See e.g. Linda Beale, Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying 
Evidentiary Privileges, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 583, 587 (2006). 
18
 Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 Tax Notes 367 (Oct. 22 2007). 
19
  See Id. (“Sophisticated avoidance techniques may be thought of as coming in two general forms.  The 
first involves the use of devices to hide income or transactions that if detected would clearly trigger 
increased tax liability. . .  [The] “second set of transactions straddle the boundary between tax avoidance 
(legal) and tax evasion (illegal).  Often these consist of a series of separate transactions, all of them 
within the letter of the tax law, that reduces tax liability, but produce no expectation for pretax economic 
gain.”).  The literature surrounding the rise in tax shelters is voluminous. See also Sagit Leviner, A New 
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regime to impose greater requirements of legal certainty on positions20 or changing 
Treasury Circular 230 requirements to encourage practitioners to temper aggressive tax 
reporting positions will not have much effect when the noncompliance does not relate to 
aggressive interpretations of the law, but rather relates to, for example, relatively 
unambiguous legal matters dependent on the accurate presentation of essential facts 
and practitioner understanding of complex but fairly unambiguous legal rules. 
 
Recent tax gap data suggests that this duality approach is not nuanced enough to 
capture the true dynamics between taxpayers and practitioners, especially when one 
views the significant tax gap figures associated with relatively unambiguous areas of the 
law.  The gross tax gap is the shortfall after the true tax liability has been paid voluntarily 
and on time, and the net tax gap is the shortfall less the amount paid late or collected 
through enforcement activities or through voluntary payments made after the original 
due date.21  Both gross and net tax gaps can be subdivided into three main 
components: the non-filing gap, the underreporting gap, and the underpayment gap.22  
The underreporting aspect of the tax gap itself is divided into three elements: 
underreported income, overstated offsets, and net arithmetical mistakes.23  The 2001 
estimate of the underreporting tax gap amounts to approximately $285 billion,24 and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Era of Tax Enforcement: From Big Stick to Responsive Regulation, University of Michigan John M. Olin 
Center for Law & Economics 1 (Updated Feb. 2007).  See e.g. Linda Beale, Tax Advice Before the 
Return: The Case for Raising Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 583, 587 
(2006). 
20
 Joint Committee on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the “Small Business And Work Opportunity Tax 
Act Of 2007” And Pension Related Provisions Contained in H.R. 2206 as Considered by the House of 
Representatives on May 24, 2007, JCX-29-07 (May 2007).  For example, the Small Business and Work 
Opportunity Tax Act (SBWOTA)  broadens the definition of tax return preparer to also include persons 
preparing estate and gift tax returns, excise tax returns, and employment tax returns; previously the 
definition centered on  income tax return preparers. I.R.C. § 6694, PL 110-113.  For tax return preparers, 
SBWOTA also replaces the realistic possibility standard for undisclosed positions with the requirement 
that there be a reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper treatment.  
The non-frivolous standard is also replaced by the requirement that there be a reasonable basis for the 
tax treatment when accompanied by a disclosure.  SBWOTA also increases penalties for the undisclosed 
positions as well as for willful or reckless positions.  For a scathing criticism of these changes see Richard 
Lipton, What Hath Congress Wrought? Amended Section 6694 Will Cause Problems for Everyone, 107 
Journal of Tax (forthcoming 2007) (noting the challenges that practitioner face in determining whether a 
position is more likely than not correct). 
21
 Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 Tax Notes 367 (Oct. 22, 2007). 
22
 James et al., Role of Tax Agencies in Influencing Taxpayer Compliance, 5th Int’l Conference on Tax 
Admin 168 (2004).  For a discussion and summary of the 2001 tax gap estimates, see IRS, Reducing the 
Federal Tax Gap (Aug. 7, 2007).  The IRS’s 2001 estimates are as follows:  the gross tax gap is at $345 
billion, and the net tax gap (that is payments that come in late, either through voluntary payments or 
enforced collection) is $290 billion. 
23
 James et al., Role of Tax Agencies in Influencing Taxpayer Compliance, 5th Int’l Conference on Tax 
Admin 168 (2004) The above definitions suggest a certainty, which may not exist depending on the 
questions of interpretation regarding the tax law.  Often, tax compliance literature considers this from the 
perspective of what the state assumes is legally owed by taxpayers, but there are situations where the 
state and taxpayers do not share the same definition.  Marcelo Bergman, Criminal Law and Tax 
Compliance in Argentina: Testing the Limits of Deterrence, 26 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 55-74 (1998). 
24
 Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 Tax Notes 369 (Oct. 22, 2007). The underpayment gap is 
estimated at $33.5 billion and the non-filing gap is estimated at 27 billion. 
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individual income tax amounts to about 69 percent of the gross underreporting tax gap. 
Of that portion of the gross tax gap, the underreporting of business income is by far the 
most significant, with 2001 estimates suggesting that sole-proprietor underreporting 
accounts for an enormous $68 billion.  While not as significant in terms of dollars, the 
tax gap associated with overstated credits, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in 
particular, is likewise very important for policymakers.  The EITC, which has become the 
nation’s largest anti-poverty program, has been in the crosshairs25 repeatedly over its 
thirty-plus year history as data suggests that close to one-third of the amount claimed is 
in fact claimed in error.26  This report will focus on the reporting of sole proprietor 
income and the proper claiming of the EITC, two areas in the individual tax gap 
characterized by complicated but fairly straightforward rules.27  
 
Both EITC taxpayers and sole proprietors use practitioners to help complete and file 
their tax returns.28  These returns often are characterized by error.29  Some scholars are 
taking note of the differences associated with errors on practitioner-prepared returns 
that arise on issues that are not characterized by legal ambiguity.  In a recent paper, 
authors Tackett, Antenucci, and Wolf30 discussed the impact of client honesty and the 
role of preparers.  The authors perceptively noted that while Circular 230 maintains that 
practitioners can be subject to sanction if they recommend a client take a position on a 
tax return that does not have a realistic possibility (a one in three chance) that the 
position would prevail in court, “there is no probabilistic standard for establishing when 
                                                 
25See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax or Welfare? The Administration of the Earned Income Credit, 52 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1867 (2005)  (summarizing the administrative and legal efforts and noting over-weighted efforts at 
compliance directed at EITC); but see Dennis Ventry, Welfare by Another Name: How  We Can Save 
EITC, 114 Tax Notes 955 (2007) (explaining that EITC is on much safer ground and that advocates’ 
overstate the compliance risks to the continued validity of the EITC). 
26
 For a discussion of the substantive EITC eligibility rules, as well as a discussion of the breakdown of 
EITC errors, see Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring, 2006 Wisc. L. Rev. 1103, 1110-14 
(2006). 
27
 This is not to say that there is no complexity associated with the proper reporting of sole proprietor 
income or claiming the EITC.  For example, in the recent legislative changes providing for uniform 
definition of claiming of qualifying child, there are significant ambiguities that likely perplex informed and 
conscientious return preparers.  See Tom Daley, Unintelligent Design, 111 Tax Notes 813 (May 15, 
2006).  Nonetheless, while there are grey areas (e.g., the distinction between expenses that must be 
capitalized  and those that can be deducted), the underreporting in these areas is largely related to the 
treatment of items not steeped in ambiguity or legal uncertainty.  C.f. Jospeph Bankman, The Story of 
Indopco: What Went Wrong in the Capitalization v Deduction Debate, TAX STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH 
LOOK AT TEN LEADING FEDERAL INCOME TAX CASES (Paul Caron, ed. 2003). 
28
 Data on the use of commercial preparers among EITC claimants is found in Janet Holtzblatt & Janet 
McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 148, 178-79 (Henry J. 
Aaron & Joel Slemrod eds., 2004).  Researchers have likewise shown that sole proprietors are 
increasingly using paid preparers.  Charles Christian, Sanjay Gupta, & Suming, 46 National Tax Journal 
487-504 (1993).  
29
.  See Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor 
Through the Tax System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 1103 (2006).  “Recent studies indicate that a significant 
amount of EITC overclaims are associated with returns which commercial practitioners prepare.  Of the 
approximately $11 billion in upper-range estimated erroneous EITC claims made in 1999, approximately 
57 percent of the overclaims were attributable to returns prepared by commercial return preparers.” Id. 
30
 James Tackett, Joe Antenucci, and Fran.Wolf, Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 Tax Notes 953 (Sept. 
10, 2007). 
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preparers should reject client tax data (or a client) because of integrity issues.”31  The 
authors also noted that preparers often give their clients the benefit of the doubt 
regarding the integrity of the data that clients provide, and consider the possibility that 
many preparers can be “unwitting participants in the filing of falsified tax returns.”32  At 
the same time, the authors acknowledge that some unscrupulous preparers are not just 
duped, but are active participants in the misstating of information on tax returns.33  
 
Analogizing return preparers to auditors, who because of Sarbanes-Oxley34 have been 
charged with a greater responsibility in ensuring integrity of the financial data associated 
with public companies, Taxett, Antenucci, and Wolf suggest that Congress may up the 
ante on preparers, and expect them to play a stronger role in taxpayer compliance.35  
While no perfect fit exists in the preparer/auditor analogy, 36 Taxett, Antenucci, and Wolf 
                                                 
31
 James Tackett, Joe Antenucci, and Fran Wolf, Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 Tax Notes 953 (Sep. 
10, 2007). Note that with the SBWOTA changes discussed above, the standard for sanction has 
changed, and the IRS will likely modify Treasury Circular 230 to reflect these changes.  See Proposed 
Treas. Circ. 10.34(a). 
32
 James Tackett, Joe Antenucci, and Fran Wolf, Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 Tax Notes 953 (Sep. 
10, 2007).  Due diligence is required under Circular 230 when practitioners are (1) preparing or assisting 
in the preparation of, approving, and filing tax returns, documents, affidavits, and other papers relating to 
IRS matters; (2) determining the correctness of oral or written representations made by the practitioner to 
the Department of Treasury; and (3) determining the correctness of oral or written representations made 
by the practitioner to clients with reference to any matter administered by the IRS.  31 CFR §§ 10.22 
(2005).  For CPAs. the Statement on Standards for Tax Services (STS) sets forth the role of the return 
preparer in relation to verifying facts essential for the completion of a tax return. STS No. 3 emphasizes 
that the ultimate responsibility for the accuracy of the return lies with the taxpayer, and that a return 
preparer “may in good faith rely, without verification, on information furnished by the taxpayer or by third 
parties.” In addition, STS No. 3 clarifies that the preparer does not generally have a duty to examine or 
verify supporting data; however, the standards also state that the preparer “should not ignore the 
implications of information furnished and should make reasonable inquiries if the information furnished 
appears to be incorrect, incomplete, or inconsistent either on its face or on the basis of other facts known 
to a member.” Statement on Standards for Tax Services No. 3, Certain Procedural Aspects of Preparing 
Returns; available at 
http://ftp.aicpa.org/public/download/members/div/tax/ssts2.pdf.  Return preparers are subject to specific 
due diligence rules in connection to the preparing of tax returns in which an individual is claiming the 
EITC.  The role of strengthening preparers’ due diligence requirements in connection with a broader 
discussion of self-regulation and enforced self-regulation will be discussed in upcoming research 
connected with this project. 
33
 See James Tackett, Joe Antenucci, and Fran Wolf, Profiling Fictitious Tax Data, 116 Tax Notes 953 
(Sept. 10, 2007).   
34
 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 107th Congress – 2nd Session (2002).  For a more general 
description of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation and its effect on lawyers and those practicing before the SEC, 
see Susan Saab Fortney, National Symposium on the Role of a Corporate Lawyer: The Anticipated and 
Actual Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on Corporate Lawyer’s Conduct, 33 Cap. U.L. Rev. 61 (2004). 
35
 James Tackett, Joe Antenucci, and Fran Wolf 116 Tax Notes 953 (Sep. 10, 2007).  The authors 
suggest that return preparers can be better equipped to address errors that are tied to clients furnishing 
false numerical information through increasing the use of digital analysis, a fraud detection method used 
by forensic accountants and certified fraud examiners.   
36
 Unlike in the corporate context, it is very difficult to costlessly rely on the public and class action bar to 
seek out and punish improper tax return preparers, whereas the gatekeeper function is more readily 
available when there is publicly available financial data and the mechanism of class action lawsuits can 
seek out and significantly punish improper auditor conduct. See Stuart Karlinsky, and Joseph Bankman, 
Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses Tax Evasion Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, 5th 
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are on the right track with their exhortation that Congress and others consider that 
preparers may be in a position to ensure that clients behave better when it comes to 
more accurately reporting their tax liabilities.  
 
This report will review the literature relating to the practitioners’ influence on tax 
compliance.  Rather than identify practitioners as exploiters or enforcers, this report will 
examine from a ground-up perspective the underlying causes of errors associated with 
two systemic issues that have had widely reported and studied noncompliance 
problems: the reporting of sole proprietors’ income and the claiming of the earned 
income tax credit.  Drawing on a wide range of sources, including existing third-party 
empirical, behavioral, and theoretical research, IRS studies, and my own experiences 
as a director of a Low Income Taxpayer Clinic (LITC), this report will consider in a more 
nuanced manner a typology of the practitioners’ role in sole proprietor and EITC 
noncompliance.  In a subsequent report, I will refine the typology further, postulate a 
theoretical context for legislative and administrative changes to assist in encouraging 
practitioners to act in a way that may possibly encourage taxpayers to file correct tax 
returns, and make specific proposals that policymakers may wish to adopt or study 
further to test effectiveness. 
 
 It is my intention that this report will help inspire discussion for an agenda for additional 
qualitative and quantitative research that may assist policymakers in designing and 
implementing proposed solutions that have, at their core, an assumption that 
practitioners can play an increasing role in creating taxpayer compliance norms, and 
assisting taxpayers in filing more accurate tax returns.37  In particular, it is my hope that 
                                                                                                                                                             
Int’l Conference on Tax Admin. n.202 (2002).  Cf. Dennis Ventry, Whistleblowers and Qui Tam for Tax, 
Tax Lawyer (forthcoming) (2007) (discussing the recently revamped tax whistleblowing program and 
suggesting that the tax system can improve on this model by adopting a whistleblowing program modeled 
on the False Claim Act). 
37
 Professor Coffee suggests two core elements necessary for increased reliance on gatekeepers to help 
control the behavior of other actors: 
1. The gatekeeper must have significant reputational capital, acquired over many years and many 
clients, which it pledges to assure accuracy of statements it makes or verifies; and 
2. Relative to the principal, the gatekeeper receives a smaller payoff for its role as certifying, 
approving or verifying information. 
See John Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 
BU L. Rev. 301 (2004).  A problem in the tax law area is that many unenrolled return preparers have no 
or little reputational capital, and while the payoff individually is small, the preparers themselves make 
significant profits through mass return preparation.  An additional problem with gatekeeper reliance, as 
Coffee notes, however, is there are also principal/agent problems, when “cowboys” within the agent’s 
organization risk reputational capital to a degree that the firms would not.  See id. at 310.  This was in part 
the defense that Jackson Hewitt raised in connection with recent allegations of preparer misconduct at 
certain of its franchise operations, as it conducted an internal review of its operations and suspended the 
franchisees named in the civil lawsuits.  See Jackson Hewitt Launches Internal Review of Allegations 
Against Franchisee, Jackson Hewitt Tax Services Inc., 
http://ir.jacksonhewitt.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=177359&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=982454&highlight=; Jackson 
Hewitt Announce Temporary Suspension of Franchised Businesses Named in U.S. Lawsuits, Jackson 
Hewitt Tax Services Inc., http://ir.jacksonhewitt.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=177359&p=irol-
newsArticle&ID=983018&highlight.  For a further discussion of the Jackson Hewitt lawsuits, see infra note 
51.   
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a more complete understanding of the dynamics of noncompliance among practitioner-
prepared returns will create opportunities for the IRS to rigorously test proposed 
solutions, with the additional use of pilot programs and use of control groups and field 
studies.38  
 
II. The Use of Preparers 
 
Some preparers, such as attorneys, CPAs, and enrolled agents (EAs), have passed 
entrance examinations and are subject to continuing education requirements, and also 
subject to licensing requirements and disciplinary proceedings.39  According to the 
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA), using data from 2005 tax 
account information, it is estimated that there are 137,928 attorneys, 181,237 CPAs, 
25,610 EAs, and 62,397 representatives with multiple Circular 230 designations.40  Yet, 
because anyone, regardless of education or training, can prepare federal income tax 
returns,41 the definition of preparer includes unlicensed preparers.  Some are self-
employed, though preparers can work for a variety of different types of enterprises, 
including law firms, CPA firms, and large national chains of return preparers such as H& 
R Block, Jackson Hewitt, and Liberty.42 
                                                                                                                                                             
Governmental efforts that have the goal of changing the behavior of tax return preparers will only 
be effective if there is a causal connection between return preparer behavior and taxpayer compliance 
decisions. See Stuart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses Tax 
Evasion Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, 5th Int’l Conference on Tax Admin. n.162 (2002); 
see also Andrew D. Cuccia, The Effects of Increased Sanctions on Paid Tax Preparers: Integrating 
Economic and Psychological Factors, 16 the Journal of the American Taxation Association 42 (1994).  
The risk of any compliance strategy focusing on preparers gives rise to the possibility that taxpayers will 
seek out other preparers not affected by governmental actions, or self-prepare returns and continue to 
misreport.  This risk is especially inherent if the noncompliance relates to issues in which the taxpayers do 
not feel they need assistance in misreporting, and if there are established taxpayer norms which suggest 
an acceptance of tax evasion. Nonetheless, this report takes as a starting assumption that at least some 
preparers do and can play a causal role in client decisions to comply, and that the government can play a 
stronger role in encouraging practitioners to positively influence taxpayer compliance decisions. 
38
 See Ian Ayres, SUPER CRUNCHERS, WHY THINKING BY NUMBERS IS THE NEW WAY TO BE 
SMART Batnam 63-69 (2007) (discussing the successful government use of randomized testing and 
regression analysis to help determine the effectiveness of proposals to reduce various State’s 
unemployment insurance payments).  Ayres emphasizes that intuition and experience alone are 
insufficient as tools for predictive government and business policies, but notes the essential role that 
experience can play in helping consider the relevant variables that researchers should test. Ayers, at 124. 
In a sense, Ayres sets out the case for a deep human understanding of the dynamics of the problem at 
hand, but argues forcefully that the understanding should form the basis for rigorous statistical analysis, 
and cautions against “theorizing as an end in itself….” Ayres, at 125.  
39
 For a summary or the myriad of ways such practitioners are registered, See National Taxpayer 
Advocate 2003 Annual Report to Congress 270.  As mentioned above, two states, California and Oregon 
require return preparers to register with the state. 
40
 Treasury Inspector General For Tax Administration, The Office of Professional Responsibility Can Do 
More to Effectively Identify and Act Against Incompetent and Disreputable Tax Practitioners 17, Table 4 , 
, 2006-10-066 (2006). 
41
 For a further discussion of estimates of the number of enrolled preparers see supra note 5; See 31 
CFR § 10.7(e) (2005). 
42
 The three largest national chain return preparers are H&R Block, Jackson Hewitt, and Liberty.  H&R 
Block is the largest, with Jackson Hewitt second, and Liberty the smallest of the three.  H&R Block states 
that the "U.S. clients served constituted 16.1 percent of an IRS estimate of total individual income tax 
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The preparer’s tasks consist of: 1) preparing the actual tax forms; 2) identifying items 
that may affect the taxpayer’s liability; and 3) advising clients on resolving any 
uncertainty that may exist as to tax consequences of ambiguous items.43  A significant 
amount of research exists surrounding why taxpayers seek preparers, including: the 
taxpayer’s belief that he or she benefited from using a paid practitioner; the taxpayer did 
not understand the tax laws; the taxpayer lacked the time and patience to complete the 
returns on his or her own;44 and the taxpayer’s fear of audit, or a belief that the use of a 
preparer minimized audit risks.45 
  
In addition to completing and filing tax returns, preparers are often responsible for 
identifying items that affect tax liability and educating taxpayers about the tax law’s 
application to the particular individual’s circumstances.  Preparers often, though not 
always, sell tax-related products or services to individuals seeking to have their returns 
completed,46 especially with respect to the EITC.  Preparers are required under internal 
revenue laws to identify themselves on the tax return, and are subject to due diligence 
requirements47 and civil and criminal penalties for inappropriate conduct.48  There are 
specific due diligence requirements that apply to practitioners preparing returns where 
the taxpayer files for the EITC.49 
                                                                                                                                                             
returns filed as of April 30, 2007, compared to 15.7 percent in 2006 and 15.6 percent in 2005."  The IRS 
estimates that 134.5 million individual income tax returns were prepared in 2005, and thus H&R Block 
prepared about 20 million of these.  See Individual Income Tax Returns, Preliminary Numbers, 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/05inplim.pdf.  Jackson Hewitt states, in its annual report, that it prepared 
3.65 million individual tax returns in 2007 in the United States.  See Jackson Hewitt Ann. Report, 
http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/17/177/177359/items/257860/JTX_2007AR.pdf (2007), (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2007).  Liberty’s Annual Report states that it prepared 1.5 million returns in the United States and 
Canada in 2007.  See Liberty Annual Report, http://www.libertytax.com/uploadedFiles/Files/2007 
%20Liberty%20Tax%20Annual%20Report.pdf (2007). 
43
 See Lin Mei Tan, Research on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpaying Compliance: Identifying 
Some the Gaps, TAXATION ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 (ed. Sawyer) (2006); 
Andrew D. Cuccia, The Effects of Increased Sanctions on Paid Tax Preparers: Integrating Economic and 
Psychological Factors, 16 the Journal of the American Taxation Association 42 (1994).  The Government 
Accountability Office, in a broad survey of taxpayers, noted that taxpayers chose to use preparers for a 
variety of reasons, including a lack of understanding of the laws, lack of time or patience to complete their 
own returns, and the belief that prepares would help facilitate the receipt of a larger or quicker refund.  
U.S. Government Accountability Office , Tax Administration: Most Taxpayers Believe They Benefit From 
Paid Tax Preparers, But Oversight for IRS is a Challenge 7-8, GAO-04-70 (2003).   
44
 U.S. Government Accountability Office , Tax Administration: Most Taxpayers Believe They Benefit 
From Paid Tax Preparers, But Oversight for IRS is a Challenge 7-12, GAO-04-70 (2003.    
45
 Lin Mei Tan, Research on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpaying Compliance: Identifying Some the 
Gaps, TAXATION ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 17 (Sawyer ed. 2006). 
46
 See Tax Return Preparation Options for Taxpayers: Hearing Before the Senate Finance Committee 3-4 
(Apr. 4, 2006) (written statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate discussing how tax 
practitioners have become a place for the cross marketing of goods and services). 
47
 I.R.C. § 6061. (discussing signing of returns and other documents).  For a further discussion of 
requirements and related penalties see supra note 7. 
48
 See supra note 9. I.R.C. §§ 6694(a)-(b), 6107(a)-(b), 6695(a)-(g), 6713(a), 7407(a), 7201, and 7206(1)-
(2). 
49
 I.R.C. § 6695(g) (imposing penalty for failure to comply with due diligence requirements with respect to 
ETIC).  Applicable regulations describe these requirements.  Reg. §1.6695-2, and the IRS summarizes 
these rules at: EITC Resources Online for Tax Professionals: Meeting Due Diligence Requirements 
11 
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III. Errors 
 
Recent GAO investigations of preparer errors,50 widely publicized Department of Justice 
civil injunction proceedings highlighting franchisees of a national chain return preparer’s 
active facilitation of bogus taxpayer refunds and overstated deductions,51 and 
Congressional testimony have focused on the role that preparers play in the tax gap.52  
There is a growing sense that with the increased use of professional preparers in the 
tax system, the IRS would be better served to understand their role in taxpayers’ 
decisions to comply with the tax laws.53  
 
For example, the recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) study that focused on 
the quality of returns prepared by preparers affiliated with national chains highlights the 
need for additional information to assist policymakers in understanding the dynamics of 
noncompliance.  The GAO study was based upon investigators testing one of two 
scenarios at 19 outlets of several commercial preparers in a metropolitan area.  The 
GAO study relied upon a mystery shopper approach, whereby GAO staff posed as 
taxpayers in one of two scenarios.  In the first scenario, the staff member posed as a 
plumber who had most of his income reported, but who also had some side income that 
                                                                                                                                                             
available at http://www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=168366,00.html (describing due diligence 
requirements and applicable penalties for failing to meet requirements). 
50
 See generally Government Accountability Office, Paid Tax Return Preparers: In A Limited Study, Chain 
Preparers Made Serious Errors, GAO-06-563T (2006). This study focused on tax returns prepared by 
paid tax return practitioners at nineteen different cites.  GAO staff posed as taxpayers and had tax returns 
prepared by practitioners at the different cites.  The results demonstrated issues with each of the returns 
ranging from small misstatements that had no effect on the tax, to large mistakes causing an effect on tax 
to be paid or the refund to be received. 
51
 For a discussion of the civil injunction proceedings, see David Ranni, Jackson Hewitt Owners Deny 
Wrongdoing, News & Observer (May 18, 2007), http://newsobserver.com/business/v-
print/story/575475.html; Jackson Hewitt Mess Hurts All Franchisees. (Apr. 4, 2007), 
http://www.franchisepick.com/jackson-hewitt-franchise-mess-hurts-all-franchisees.  The complaints in the 
injunction suits can be found at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv07215.htm; United States v. Smart Tax Inc., 
No. 07C-1802 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 2, 2007); United States v. Smart Tax of Georgia Inc., No. 07CV-0747 (N.D. 
Ga Apr. 2, 2007); United States v. Smart Tax of North Carolina, No. 5:07-cv-00125-FL (E.D. N.C. Apr. 2, 
2007); United States v. So Far Inc., No. 2:07-cv-11470 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007). The cases were recently 
settled.  The cases have been resolved. See Department of Justice, Corporations That Owned Jackson 
Hewitt Franchises in Three States Agree to Be Barred From Tax Return Preparation, (Sept. 28,2007), 
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_tax_779.html.  
52
 See GAO 2007 Tax Filing Season Interim Results and Updates of Previous Assessments of Paid 
Preparers and IRS Modernization and Compliance Research Efforts: Hearing Before Sen. Fin. Comm. 
110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement of James R. White, Dir. Strategic Issues and statement of David A. 
Powner, Dir. Information Technology Management Issues); Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is 
Worth a Pound of Cure:  Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement 
submitted by AICPA); Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Hearing 
Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner of IRS); 
Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. 
Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit Treasury 
Inspector Gen. for Tax Admin.). 
53
 See Government Accountability Office, Interim Results and Updates of Previous Assessments of Paid 
Preparers And IRS’s Modernization and Compliance Research Efforts 4-5, GAO-07-720T (2007) (noting 
GAO mystery study and commenting on the importance of research relative to the tax gap). 
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was not reflected on Forms W-2.  He had enough deductions so that it was 
advantageous for him to itemize deductions.  In the other scenario, the staff member 
posed as a single mother who worked as a retail sales clerk, but who also had income 
from babysitting.  She had one child who lived with her, and one who did not. 
  
The study found major errors, especially with respect to the EITC and the reporting of 
side income.  In the GAO study the preparers did not report side income in ten of 19 
cases, and the preparers did not ask about where a child lived or ignored answers to 
the question, and claimed an ineligible child for the EITC in five out of the ten applicable 
cases.54  In cases were side income was an issue, preparers gave the mystery 
shoppers a variety of advice.  Several mystery shoppers were informed that “such 
income was the decision of the taxpayer because the IRS would not know of it unless it 
was reported.”55  Discussions of side income usually also ended up in advice of 
expenses to offset the income.56 
 
The GAO study caused quite a stir, inspiring, in part, congressional hearings57 and 
garnering a fair bit of media attention.58  While informative, the GAO test, at the same 
time as highlighting problems, raised some important overall questions of the role that 
preparers play, especially in connection with fairly straightforward tax rules.  The GAO 
report indicated the possible factors behind the high error rates; namely, it referred to 
the broad range of experience and lack of training of national chain employees, and to 
different standards paid preparers are governed by.59  The GAO recommended that the 
IRS conduct research into the extent that preparers are living up to their responsibilities, 
and asked the IRS to consider whether the GAO’s use of its mystery shopper 
                                                 
54
 Government Accountability Office, Paid Tax Return Preparers: In A Limited Study, Chain Preparers 
Made Serious Errors, GAO-06-563T, (2006). 
55
 Id. 
56
 Id. 
57
 In 2007, the Senate Finance Committee held a hearing discussing many of the issues pointed out by 
the 2006 GAO study.  The hearing included an update from the GAO on actions taken by the IRS in 
response to the 2006 study as well as statements from the Commissioner of the IRS.  See generally 
Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. 
Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark Everson, Commissioner of IRS); Filing Your Taxes: An 
Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. 
(2007) (statement of Michael R. Phillips, Deputy Inspector Gen. for Audit Treasury Inspector Gen. for Tax 
Admin.); GAO 2007 Tax Filing Season Interim Results and Updates of Previous Assessments of Paid 
Preparers and IRS Modernization and Compliance Research Efforts: Hearing Before Sen. Fin. Comm. 
110th Cong. 2 n.3 (2007) (statement of James R. White, Dir. Strategic Issues and statement of David A. 
Powner, Dir. Information Technology Management Issues). 
58
 See Albert Crenshaw, Some Tax Preparers Don’t Add Up: Test of Commercial Firms Finds Errors in 19 
of 19 Returns, Washington Post (April 5, 2006) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/04/04/AR2006040401863.html (detailing findings of GAO study). 
59
 Different types of paid preparers (CPAs, attorneys, EAs, and unenrolled preparers) are subject to 
different governing standards. As discussed above, CPAs and attorneys may also be subject to different 
rules within the governing body of their professions.  See Government Accountability Office, Paid Tax 
Return Preparers: In A Limited Study, Chain Preparers Made Serious Errors, GAO-06-563T, (2006). 
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methodology was something that the IRS should employ to better gauge the quality of 
services that return preparers provide. 60  
 
 
IV. Theoretical Context of Tax Gap Research 
 
A. Tax Compliance Generally 
 
 Before considering the literature surrounding practitioners’ role in tax compliance, 
it is important to understand the broader tax compliance research context in which this 
literature exists.61  Over the past thirty years a significant amount of research from a 
variety of social science disciplines considered tax compliance.  Economists, 
psychologists and sociologists have contributed to the discussion, offering research and 
at times conflicting explanations regarding the dependent variable of whether a person 
is likely to comply with his obligations to file an accurate tax return.62  In the jargon of 
social science research, the unifying theme among this research is a search for 
explanatory reasons, referred to as independent variables, to help explain the factors 
that lead to noncompliance.  The disciplines’ approach to research reflects differing 
approaches to how and why the variables might be related and the various disciplines’ 
choice of which variables to focus on reflects, in part, their assumptions about what 
motivates human behavior.   
 
In broad terms, the economic models of tax compliance assume rational behavior, and 
that people will coldly consider compliance from the perspective as to whether the 
expected utility to noncomply exceeds the utility from complying.  To that end, 
researchers relying on the economic model looked to a variety of independent variables 
likely to affect the calculus, including penalty rates, the likelihood of audit, and the tax 
                                                 
60
 There has not been significant research into the quality of commercial return preparation, though the 
Casey Foundation has sponsored a limited research project.  See Amy Brown for the Annie E. Casey 
Foundation, Quality in Free and Commercial Tax Preparation: Results from the 2006 Tax Season (June 
2006).  This study did a review of both free tax preparation sites as well as a small number of 
commercially prepared returns.  The reviews looked at all aspects of each federal tax return.  Seventy-
three percent of all returns reviewed that had been prepared by paid practitioners had mistakes.  Sixty-
seven percent of returns prepared by tax practitioners contained material mistakes, i.e. those which 
changed the refund amount.  By comparing the data of both the GAO and Casey Study, it can be seen 
that the mistakes found were similar.  Id.  The Casey Foundation and others have reviewed quality and 
error rates at various free return preparation sites, and similarly have found that many sites suffer from 
signification error rates.  Id.  See also Dustin Stamper, IRS to Test Accuracy of Returns Prepared at 
Volunteer Income Tax Assistance Sites 2007 TNT 222-6 (Nov. 15, 2007) (addressing IRS concerns for 
VITA sites having just over 50 percent accuracy in recent years); Treasury Inspector General for Tax 
Administration, Accuracy of Volunteer Tax Returns Is Improving, but Procedures Are Often Not Followed, 
2007-40-137 (Aug. 29, 2007) (reviewing preparation of income tax returns at IRS volunteer sites). 
61
 This overview is similar to that I summarized in Leslie Book, Freakonomics and the Tax Gap: An 
Applied Perspective, 56 Amer. L. Rev. 1163 (2007). 
62
 I am indebted to the excellent theoretical overview of the respective social sciences approach to tax 
compliance research in Neil Brooks, Challenge of Tax Compliance, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACING 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE 19 (Eds. Evans and Greenbaum) (1998). 
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rate and income level.63  This research has become quite sophisticated.  There are 
numerous studies testing the variables that economists believe contribute to taxpayers’ 
decisions to comply with the tax laws.64 
 
Psychologists and sociologists have rightly pointed out that the economic model is 
insufficient as an explanatory tool.  Sociologists and psychologists alike argue that 
framing a taxpayer as an amoral utility maximizer fails to capture the complexities of 
human behavior and relationships, and fails to explain why compliance rates exceed 
what would otherwise be expected if people were solely evaluating compliance in terms 
of dollars and cents.65  According to Erich Kirchler: 
 
the financial self-interest model assumes that tax compliance and evasion are 
outcomes of rational decisions based on audit probability, detection probability 
and sanctions. On the other hand, the bahavioural model of tax evasion includes 
economic, psychological and sociological variables such as demographic 
characteristics (e.g., education, income level, income source, occupation) social 
representations and attitudes (e.g., tax ethics, and social norms, fairness 
perceptions), and structural characteristics (e.g., complexity of the system, audit 
probability and detection probability, sanctions, and tax rates).  Based on the 
rather small effects of variables considered in the neoclassical economic 
approach (i.e., audit probability, fines, marginal tax rate and income), several 
studies conclude that it is important to consider also citizens’ acceptance of 
political and administrative actions and attitudinal, moral and justice issues as 
they are central to psychological and sociological approaches.  Andreoni, Erard 
and Feinstien consider the development of purely economic models of tax 
compliance from a perspective of game theory and principal agent theory.  
However, they add, these models are rather poor descriptions of real-world tax 
systems.66 
 
The research provides little in the way of a united theory on tax compliance.  As 
Professor Brooks aptly summarizes, in a perfect or even merely orderly world the 
research would lead to:  
 
a theory about why people comply with the tax law from which an interested tax 
administration department could deduce a comprehensive compliance strategy. 
No such theory has emerged from the research. Like much empirical research, 
we end up learning how much we do not know.  In some of the research, it is 
difficult to be sure which way causation runs…in more controlled experiments 
                                                 
63
 Erich Kirchler, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 160 (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) (2007). 
64
 For an excellent summary of the empirical research implicating the rational model of tax compliance, 
see Erich Kirchler, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 107-18 (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) (2007). 
65
 E.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, Symposium Norms and Corporate Law: Fairness, Character, and Efficiency 
in Firms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1717, 1725 (2001). 
66
 Erich Kirchler, THE ECONOMIC PSYCHOLOGY OF TAX BEHAVIOUR 160 (Cambridge University 
Press 2007) (2007). 
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conducted to test for causation there are problems generalizing the results…and 
theories based on some research have become so complex that they explain 
everything, by tautology.67 
 
 
The tax compliance literature is often lacking the sweep of context, of true 
understanding of patterns of human behavior. 68  To date, the quantitative approach to 
tax compliance has failed to offer satisfactory predictive generalizations.  One 
perceptive commentator, Margaret McKerchar, in addressing the shortfalls in the 
compliance literature, notes that research has been driven by the need to find a model 
fitting all possible types of compliance behavior with the goal of the research to allow 
predictions to be made about the taxpaying population in general.  “In doing so, 
assumptions …were often unrealistic and therefore reduced the usefulness of the model 
to policymakers and administrators.  For example, it is unlikely that taxpayers are all 
utility maximizers, risk averse or rational decision makers. . . . [P]eople exist in a 
dynamic environment where there are a great deal of influences, of which some are 
inconstant and others may not yet been identified or studied by researchers.”69 
 
Facing the inadequacy and shortfalls of the existing compliance literature, Professor 
McKerchar noted that researchers and policymakers would be better served by 
abandoning the search for a single model of taxpayer compliance, and considering the 
use of differing models “to explain differing types of compliance behaviour.”  McKerchar 
continued by emphasizing the importance of identifying the various typologies of 
noncompliance, 70  and urges that additional studies relate to actual observed taxpayer 
behavior and focus group study.71   
 
B.  Tax Practitioner Research 
 
 There is relatively little IRS data, publicly released, that identifies and compares 
errors between self-prepared and practitioner-prepared returns.72  Like the tax 
                                                 
67
 Neil Brooks, Challenge of Tax Compliance, TAX ADMINISTRATION: FACING THE CHALLENGE OF 
THE FUTURE 22 (Evans and Greenbaum, eds. 1998). 
68
 See Pauline Niemirowski, Steve Baldwin and Alex Wearing, Thirty Years of Tax Compliance Research: 
of What Value Is It to the ATO, TAX ADMIN. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 211-12 (Walpole and Evans, Eds.) 
(2001). These authors note studies identifying 64 variables for noncompliance, and bemoan the 
contradictory and inconclusive research:  “Beliefs, personality traits, demographic variables and tax rates, 
opportunity, propensity to evade, and various external variables have also contributed to understanding 
compliance behaviour.  Yet despite the extensive research, there is still a paucity of consistent reliable 
predictors or explanations of causality.”  Id. 
69
 Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply, TAX ADMIN. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 242 (Walpole 
& Evans, Eds.) (2001). 
70
 I began this project of applying the useful Kiddder/McEewn typology to low income taxpayers in 51 Kan 
Law Rev 1145 (2003) and continued it with a focus on commercial tax return preparers in my article in the 
Wisconsin Law Review, see generally Leslie Book, Preventing the Hybrid from Backfiring: Delivery of 
Benefits to the Working Poor Through the Tax System, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 1103 (2006). 
71
 Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply, TAX ADMIN. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 242 (Walpole 
& Evans, Eds.) (2001). 
72See Eric Toder, What is the Tax Gap?, 117 Tax Notes 392 (Oct. 22, 2007) (stating that while the IRS 
has revitalized its tax gap research program since 2000, there are some measures of noncompliance 
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compliance literature generally, the literature regarding the role that practitioners play in 
compliance has been growing in recent years but also is inconclusive.  In a recent 
sweeping review of the studies to date, Professor Lin Mei Tan, at Massey University in 
New Zealand, stated that “it is not clear whether the tax practitioner is part of the tax 
compliance problem.  Neither is it clear as to how ethically sensitive they are.  What is 
clear is that they can influence the taxpayers’ compliance behavior.”73  This insight is 
crucial for it holds out the hope for governments that they can, in some way, influence 
practitioners to influence taxpayers to comply with the internal revenue laws. 
    
Key questions involve to what extent practitioners influence compliance decision of their 
clients, and to what extent the government uses tools to help practitioners be agents for 
greater taxpayer compliance or influence taxpayers in a manner that contributes to less 
non compliance.  Professor Tan wrote extensively on the issue, looking at studies that 
considered the reasons for using tax practitioners, the studies exploring preferences for 
types of advice, how taxpayers choose their practitioner, and how taxpayers evaluate 
the services they receive.  Studies from the tax practitioner’s perspective considered 
whether the use of a tax practitioner would result in lower compliance, and analyzed the 
variables that are related to practitioners’ willingness to be aggressive.  Studies that 
have considered practitioner aggressiveness fall within three main categories: 1) 
decision context features (e.g., legal ambiguity, practitioner penalties, probability of 
audit, size of tax benefit); 2) client’s characteristics (e.g., client importance, risk 
preferences, year-end financial condition of client) and practitioner characteristics (e.g., 
practitioner demographics, including age, experience and education level;  practitioner 
risk attitudes; type of practitioner; and size of establishment where practitioner works).  
Some of those studies are described below. 
 
C.  Who is the Real Instigator of Aggressive Advice? 
 
 Wading through the empirical evidence and studies leads to an inconclusive 
answer to the question as to who instigates noncompliant behavior, the taxpayer or the 
practitioner. The type of advice given by tax practitioners is usually classified as either 
“conservative” or “aggressive.”  Hite and McGill defined aggressive as “taking a pro-
taxpayer position on a questionable item.”74  In their study, an aggressive position was 
“a situation where there is some reasonable probability that a particular tax return will 
not be upheld by an IRS review and subsequently legal challenge.”75  They researched 
a random sample of U.S. residents with a hypothetical scenario.76  The study showed 
taxpayers tended to agree with conservative advice from their practitioners but disagree 
                                                                                                                                                             
where there is a need for additional information, including “relative compliance rates among taxpayers 
who prepare returns by hand, prepare returns with software, and use paid preparers”).  Id. 
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with aggressive advice.77  This suggests taxpayers prefer to be on the “safe side.”78  
Hite and McGill found that taxpayers do not prefer aggressive advice, and therefore 
suggested that “professional experience and tax education inculcates potential tax 
advisors with a prevailing professional culture of aggressive tax planning.”79    
 
In a study discussing how professional standards of conduct mitigate aggressive 
reporting by tax professionals, Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson concluded that a 
professional “made an aggressive reporting decision if the practitioner selects the 
reporting position that portrays events favorably when that position is not indicated 
clearly by the facts and relevant professional literature.”80  The study looked at 
practitioner’s actions when a standard is vague.  The experiment provided subjects with 
“either an incentive to report aggressively or conservatively and a practice standard 
which employed a vague, verbal threshold.”81   Their results show that those who had 
an incentive to report aggressively made more liberal interpretations of the standard 
than those who had an incentive to report conservatively.82   
 
L. M. Tan conducted a study in New Zealand, based on the Hite and McGill study, on 
the taxpayer’s preference for the type of advice.83  The group surveyed was a more 
focused group, using business taxpayers, most of whom engage tax practitioners to 
preparer their tax returns.84  Tan found that most taxpayers tend to agree with advice, 
conservative or aggressive, given by their practitioner.  This supports the notion 
presented by Hite and McGill that tax practitioners are the ones encouraging the 
aggressive positions as the taxpayers tend to agree with whatever advice is presented 
by their preparer.85 
 
While Hite and McGill and Tan’s studies proposed that the tax practitioner pushes 
aggressive advice on the taxpayer, Schisler’s study suggested that it is in fact the 
taxpayer who is the instigator of aggressive tax advice.86  Schisler conducted an 
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experimental study in the United States.87  “As compared to tax practitioners, taxpayers 
are found to be more aggressive with tax due, to have lower equity perception of the tax 
system, and are more aggressive when ambiguous tax issues are involved.”88  This is 
contrary to the findings of Hite and McGill and Tan.  Klepper and Nagin, in their study, 
analyzing data from the TCMP and Pennsylvania Department of Revenue, found that 
practitioners tend to improve compliance on items that are clear, but tend to help 
taxpayers exploit ambiguity by taking aggressive positions on ambiguous items.89 
 
Some studies support the view that practitioners view taxpayers as instigators of 
aggressive advice, but also recognize that the search for a single model that explains 
the complex dynamics of practitioner/taxpayer interaction is likely inadequate.  Sakurai 
and Braithwaite,90 for example, classify practitioners into three distinct types: 1) honest 
and risk adverse, 2) cautious minimizers of tax, and 3) the creative and aggressive 
planner.  Sakurai and Braithwaite concluded that the latter is the least popular in terms 
of taxpayer preference, but that this aggressive practitioner type is of particular concern.  
They suggested that taxpayers are inclined to seek out preparers who share their 
values.91  This insight is consistent with Karlinsky and Bankman’s study of sole 
proprietor noncompliance, where sole proprietors intent on minimizing income sought 
preparers they knew who would be comfortable with their approach.92  It is also 
consistent with Albert, Bloomquist and Edgerton’s study of underreporting, which 
suggests that a relatively small amount of practitioners are responsible for a 
disproportionate share of underreporting of certain types of income.93  Likewise, Kidder, 
and McEwen, adapting a sociological approach, postulated that there are different types 
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of practitioners, those that broker or facilitate compliant behavior, and those that 
facilitate noncompliant behavior.94 
 
As Professor Tan indicated in her Research in The Role of Tax Practitioners in 
Taxpayer Compliance: Understanding the Gaps,95 there are significant shortfalls in the 
literature to date:   
The literature to date is not clear as to whether taxpayers are instigators of 
aggressive advice or whether tax practitioners comply with such demands. It 
is also not clear whether it is in fact the practitioner who influences their 
clients’ tax compliance behaviour. With their reliance on tax practitioners, it is 
possible that some clients who prefer conservative advice may also be 
convinced by their practitioners to accept aggressive advice. Furthermore, it 
is also possible that practitioners may have incorrectly inferred the 
preferences of their clients. 
Most prior studies failed to take into account the interactions between the 
taxpayers and their practitioners. Most studies were conducted from either 
the perspective of the taxpayer only or the practitioner only. These two 
categories of studies therefore present only one side of the picture. There is 
certainly a lack of knowledge of how tax practitioners and their clients 
interact or what the practitioner-client relationship is. This is a potential area 
for future research.96 
 
Tan’s perceptive critique focused largely on practitioners’ influence with respect to 
positions that have at their core some degree of uncertainty.  Yet, the literature has not 
focused on practitioner influence on items that are not characterized by ambiguity.  For 
unambiguous items, individuals present themselves to practitioners in three broad ways: 
1) they want help in preparing their tax returns correctly; 2) they want assistance in 
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facilitating the taking of improper positions, with assistance taking a variety of different 
forms; or 3) they do not have a strong preference and look to their practitioners for 
guidance.  
 
 As Sakurai and Braithwaite suggested, some practitioners, regardless of client 
preference, will not knowingly facilitate underreporting of sole proprietor income, nor will 
they assist people in claiming an EITC incorrectly.  When taxpayers intent on 
underreporting visit that group of practitioners, practitioners may be able to moderate 
taxpayer behavior, though more research is needed to examine this.  For example, how 
moderating can practitioners be?  Can Congress or the IRS encourage practitioners to 
assist in encouraging taxpayers toward compliance without alienating taxpayers or 
contributing to taxpayers’ potential concerns that practitioners may not have sufficient 
loyalty to their clients?  If practitioners can, at least at the margin, temper improper 
taxpayer behavior, what actions should the government take to encourage taxpayers to 
visit the “right” type of preparers and educate preparers on the actions they can take to 
become positive influences on compliance?  What role does skills and ethics training 
play in practitioners’ willingness to facilitate or tolerate noncompliance? Should the 
government require only certain types of preparers to prepare more complex returns, or 
returns that research indicates have a potential for misreporting or error?  Do we know 
enough about the characteristics or identities of practitioners who facilitate 
noncompliance, or is more research needed so we can better identify those 
practitioners?  Should the government provide incentives to taxpayers or practitioners to 
facilitate the use of better or perhaps regulated preparers, or impose additional burdens 
or costs on those who fail to use preparers that will have a tendency to facilitate 
compliance?   
 
The above questions, McKerchar and Brooks’ critique of tax compliance research 
generally, and Tan’s critique of the tax compliance literature as it relates to practitioners, 
are all premised on a need for a deeper and layered approach to understanding the 
decision to comply with the tax laws.  Researchers who seek deeper understanding 
have often turned to more qualitative approaches to problems.  Few researchers have 
attempted to undertake a more qualitative analysis of tax noncompliance, which would 
allow for an inquiry that would include a search for contextualized findings.97  There are 
varying definitions in the social science literature, but qualitative social science research 
methodology has at its core an “interpretive, naturalistic approach to its subject 
matter,”98 and is an “inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological 
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traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem”99involving the use and 
collection of a variety of empirical materials, including case studies, personal 
experience, focus groups, interviews, and participant observation.  Unlike quantitative 
research, which seeks to generate data, and allow researchers to reach reliable and 
repeatable conclusions, qualitative research looks to collect data from the above 
methods, and generate ideas and hypotheses from these data largely through what is 
known as inductive reasoning.100  The strength of good qualitative research is that it 
uses a variety of data collection methods, that should touch the core of what is going on 
rather than skimming the surface.101  The goal of this type of research is to build a 
complex picture that goes beyond a focus on causal relationships, and would allow 
policymakers and researchers to gain a nuanced understanding which would create 
opportunities for researchers to hypothesize and test solutions that could then be 
subjected to rigorous statistical analysis.102 
 
Kidder and McEwen likewise emphasized the importance of exploratory ethnographic 
research and interviews as a basis for understanding the role of practitioners, 
suggesting that the role of practitioners may best be learned by observing interactions 
between practitioners and taxpayers.  Kidder and McEwen recommended the creation 
of standard tax scenarios, and recommended bringing those scenarios to different 
preparers to evaluate how they treat specific tax situations.103 
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V. Overview of the Role of the Practitioner in Sole Proprietor and EITC 
Noncompliance 
 
The tax gap in 2001 attributable to the individual income tax was estimated at 
245 billion104 and accounted for 71 percent 105 of the total tax gap.  The underreporting 
portion of the tax gap is the most significant of the overall gap.  Individuals have 
increasingly turned to third parties, or tax return preparers, to prepare their tax returns. 
For example, in 2005, 80 million tax returns were prepared by paid practitioners, up 
from 63 million tax returns only nine years before.106  In 2005, 62 percent of all tax 
returns were completed and signed by paid practitioners.107 
 
With the increased use of preparers it is becoming increasingly important to understand 
what role those preparers play in tax compliance.  One interesting question is the role 
that practitioners play in facilitating the underreporting aspect of the tax gap, and, in 
particular, noncompliance among taxpayers who either overstate deductions or credits 
or who underreport income.  The underreporting of the tax gap, and the way that the 
government can address the underreporting tax gap, has been the subject of increasing 
academic and governmental attention.108  One area that has received relatively little 
attention is the role that practitioners play in tax noncompliance, especially in relation to 
items or taxpayers where there is little legal uncertainty.109 This project is an attempt to 
raise questions and identify areas for future qualitative and quantitative research 
regarding the role of practitioners in tax compliance.  
 
An important premise of this project is that there is not one particular compliance 
problem associated with the tax system, but rather many different compliance problems 
that vary greatly by issue and type of taxpayer.  For example, the role of practitioners in 
noncompliance is different when one compares sophisticated high net worth individuals 
wishing to avoid or defer taxes from large gains associated with an entrepreneur’s 
building and selling a high tech business to a small dry cleaner who comes to a self-
employed public accountant and wants to file tax returns failing to show 100 percent of 
the business’s gross receipts.  Likewise, a low-wage single parent sharing custody of 
her child who wishes to get the maximum earned income tax credit generated-refund 
presents a different compliance picture than an upper middle class suburban woman 
who wants to sell her residence and has failed to maintain all records of home 
improvements to properly compute basis.  There are many different types of taxpayers 
and practitioners, with noncompliance stemming from sophisticated tax shelters110 
which may play on legal ambiguity, to relatively simple schemes based upon the 
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straightforward and not too ambiguous decision to fail to report some percentage of 
income from a cash business. 
 
In this project, I will look in depth at two areas of systemic individual noncompliance, the 
underreporting of income from the cash business sector, and the overstating of the 
earned income tax credit (EITC).  Both represent significant areas of noncompliance.  
The underreporting of business income is the greatest component of the individual 
underreporting aspect of the tax gap, contributing to almost a third of the estimated tax 
gap.111  The EITC is likewise important in that it has increasingly become the federal 
government’s principal tool for addressing child poverty and rewarding low wage 
work.112  The error rate in the EITC in 1999 was approximately 27 to 32 percent of all 
EITC payments,113 significantly higher than the overall tax compliance rate but lower 
than the estimated noncompliance rate among sole proprietors.  Moreover, IRS, 
Congress, and GAO have highlighted EITC noncompliance over the past decade, and a 
series of IRS compliance studies focusing on the EITC, provides researchers with 
insights into the role that practitioners have played in its error rate.114  
 
In recent years, there has been a significant amount of academic,115 administrative,116 
and legislative117 attention on the errors associated with the EITC, with less focus on the 
tax gap associated with sole proprietors.118  That lack of attention is starting to change, 
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especially in light of the National Research Program (NRP)119 data highlighting the high 
rate of noncompliance and the high relative amount of the tax gap associated with sole 
proprietors.  Given the relative lack of attention to sole proprietors, this section contains 
a more robust discussion of sole proprietor noncompliance, looking at the data the IRS 
recently released, as well as a review of some of the research that sheds light on the 
underlying causes for the high error rate in this sector.  
 
A. Sole Proprietor Noncompliance  
 
As mentioned above, the numbers associated with sole proprietor noncompliance are 
startlingly high.  Sole proprietors are a fairly diverse group, but their hallmark in IRS 
compiled tax gap data is that they own unincorporated businesses and report their 
business receipts and expenses on their Form 1040 through the completion of a 
Schedule C.  Proprietors with receipts under $5,000 are allowed to report all their 
results on a simplified form, Schedule C-EZ.  For 2003, the most current year that data 
is available, about 20.6 million sole proprietors filed income tax returns, with sole 
proprietors accounting for approximately 72 percent of all businesses in the US.120  The 
taxpayers in this segment are diverse, from physical trainers, house cleaners, architects 
and hairstylists selling services, to EBAY sellers, small grocers, and people who make 
their living selling small homemade crafts. 
 
One of the key distinctions between sole proprietors and wage earners is that the 
compliance rate for wage earners is very high,121 while most sole proprietors (about 61 
percent) understated income, and that there was misreporting of about 57 percent of the 
net business income.122  Perhaps most interesting was GAO’s identification that a small 
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percentage of the taxpayers are responsible for most of the misreporting.  GAO 
estimates that about 1.25 million taxpayers accounted for the largest ten percent of 
understatements, where the mean understated amount was about $18,000.123 
 
GAO recently reported that the reasons for the high rates of sole proprietor 
noncompliance are “well known,” focusing on the opportunity for concealment that is 
associated with the lack of third party reporting124 and withholding on payments to 
proprietors.125  The 2007 GAO report on identifying strategies to reduce sole proprietor 
noncompliance involved a broad approach, including providing additional educational 
outreach and assistance, especially to first-time filers, requiring separation of personal 
and business bank accounts, clarifying the rules distinguishing independent contractors 
and employees, imposing additional information reporting requirements, improving audit 
selection,126 and enhancing the sharing of data with states. Interestingly despite data 
showing that approximately 73 percent of sole proprietors used paid practitioners in tax 
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year 2005,127 GAO does not discuss the role of practitioners, nor do any of the solutions 
highlight the important role that practitioners can play in this area.128 
 
B.  EITC Noncompliance 
 
 A significant number of people who file returns purporting to be eligible for EITC 
benefits are not in fact eligible in whole or in part or are unable to demonstrate eligibility.  
A 1999 IRS study of EITC claims estimated that, of about 18.8 million tax returns 
(representing approximately $31.3 billion in claims), between $9.7 billion and $11.1 
billion of EITC claims were erroneous.129  IRS enforcement activities prevented or 
recovered approximately $1.2 billion in improper claims.130  Thus, using upper range 
estimates, the IRS should not have paid approximately $9.9 billion of the claims.  More 
recent (2005) estimates of EITC noncompliance suggest that even after a number of 
legislative and administrative changes designed to improve the administration of the 
EITC, approximately 23 to 28 percent of EITC was paid or credited erroneously, with 
IRS enforcement preventing another $2 billion in improper claims131 
  
Analysis of tax-year compliance data from 1999 shows that 80 percent of the 
overclaims, and 75 percent of overclaim dollars stemming from those improper claims 
are attributable to three types of errors.132  These included: (1) approximately $3 billion 
to qualifying child errors on 1.6 million returns; (2) approximately $2 billion to filing 
status errors on 1.3 million returns; and (3) approximately $1.9 billion to income 
misreporting errors on 3.6 million returns.133  The most common qualifying child error 
involved claiming a child who did not live with the taxpayer for over half of the taxable 
year and therefore did not satisfy the EITC residency requirement.134  Another common 
qualifying child error involved claiming a child who did not have the required relationship 
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 IRS data shows that 15,008,081 Schedule C filers used a paid preparer out of a total 20,596,287 
Schedule C filers in tax year 2005.   Tax Year 2005, IRS Compliance Data Warehouse, Individual Returns 
Transaction File (IRTF).   
128
 The National Taxpayer Advocate has pointed out that there is very little in the way of consistent data 
regarding the “number and types of errors on returns, tracked by type of return preparer.”  National 
Taxpayer Advocate 2002 Annual Report to Congress 225.  
129
 IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3, 11 tbl.1 
(2002).  The noncompliance range is attributable to differing assumptions for those claimants who did not 
respond to the IRS compliance study.  See id. at 3; Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Complicated 
Lives: Tax Administration Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, CONFERENCE ON THE CRISIS IN TAX 
ADMINISTRATION 163 (2003). 
130
 IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3, 11 tbl.1 
(2002).  
131
 This is based primarily on NRP data. Filing Your Taxes: An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of 
Cure: Hearing Before the Senate Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mark Everson, 
Commissioner of IRS). Examinations accounted for $1.34 billion and math error adjustments accounted 
for $330 million.  The balance is from document matching activities. 
132
 IRS, COMPLIANCE ESTIMATES FOR EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT CLAIMED ON 1999 RETURNS 3, 13 tbl.2 
(2002). 
133
 Id. 
134
 Administration of the Earned Income Credit, IRS Announcement 2003-40, at 1133 available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=110298,00.html. 
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to the taxpayer.135  The data shows much overlap among the common errors, as most 
children who did not meet the relationship requirement also did not meet the residency 
requirement.136 
 
Recent studies indicated that a significant amount of EITC overclaims were associated 
with returns that commercial preparers prepared. Of the approximately $11 billion in 
upper-range estimated erroneous EITC claims made in 1999,137 approximately 57 
percent of the overclaims were attributable to returns prepared by commercial return 
preparers.138  The overall error rate among taxpayers who reported using a preparer 
was 34.6 percent, compared with 37.8 percent among those who did not report using a 
paid preparer. 
 
Also, there are significant variations in the error rate among the different type of 
preparers. In 1999, about 25 percent of the EITC was claimed in error.  The 35.2 
percent of the claimants using other commercial preparers had a much higher error rate 
of 36.2 percent.139   
 
140
 
 
The presence of the EITC-generated refund and the ability to monetize the anticipated 
refund immediately (and thus pay the preparation and related costs) contribute to the 
presence of both the national marketplace leaders (like H & R Block), as well as local 
“mom and pop” storefront preparers (who often are not enrolled agents or accountants, 
but who are self-employed or working for smaller local firms).141  It is unclear whether 
the difference in error rates among classes of preparers is attributable to the preparers’ 
skills or scruples, or to the client characteristics of those using the different preparer 
types.142 
 
VI. A General Discussion of How Practitioners Facilitate Noncompliance 
                                                 
135
 Administration of the Earned Income Credit, IRS Announcement 2003-40, at 1133 available at 
http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=11 0298,00.html. 
136 Id. 
137
 Janet Holtzblatt & Janet McCubbin, Complicated Lives: Tax Administration Issues Affecting Low-
Income Filers, CONFERENCE ON THE CRISIS IN TAX ADMINISTRATION 163 (2003). 
138
 National Taxpayer Advocate 2003 Annual Report to Congress 270.  
139
 Janet Holtzblatt and Janet McCubbin, Issues Affecting Low-Income Filers, in The Crisis in Tax 
Administration 170-171 (Brookings Institution Press 2004). 
140
 National Taxpayer Advocate 2002 Annual Report to Congress. 
141
 National Taxpayer Advocate, 2003 Annual Report to Congress 170-71; Alan Berube et al, The 
Brookings Institution, The Price of Paying Taxes: How Tax Preparation and Refund Loan Fees Erode the 
Benefits of the EITC, p. 4 available at http://www.dlc.org/documents/Price_of_Paying_Taxes.pdf . 
142
 National Taxpayer Advocate 2003 Annual Report to Congress 171. 
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A. Introduction 
 
Researchers recently emphasized the importance of understanding the practitioner’s 
role in brokering or facilitating noncompliance,143 based in part on the insights of 
sociologists Robert Kidder and Craig McEwen.144  Writing about the benefits of setting 
out such a typology, Kidder and McEwen remind us that viewing compliance variables 
too narrowly has the effect of limiting understanding of the complexities underlying 
taxpayer decisions whether to comply or not to comply with the tax laws.145  Thus, as I 
have written elsewhere, as a necessary prerequisite to understanding the causes of 
noncompliance and the potential policies to redress noncompliance, one must define 
noncompliance based upon the various reasons why people comply or fail to comply in 
different areas of the tax law.  
 
While a typology in and of itself is unlikely to completely capture the complexities of 
human behavior, nor allow us to statistically measure possible administrative or 
legislative efforts directed at reducing errors on returns that practitioners prepare, it 
does allow us to think more precisely about why tax returns prepared by paid preparers 
may have a significant level of errors.  Kidder and McEwen identify brokered 
noncompliance as taxpayer noncompliance that is undertaken upon the direction of a 
knowledgeable tax expert.146  This is a useful first step, but it can be broken up further 
to help us better understand the practitioner’s role in the tax gap.  As Kidder and 
McEwen discussed, much tax compliance literature focuses too narrowly on intentional 
violations, and the original Kidder/McEwen discussion of brokered noncompliance too 
narrowly considers advisors in that capacity.  
 
As indicated in the literature survey above, research to date is inconsistent or at least 
unclear in helping us understand the role that practitioners play in tax compliance.147  In 
an attempt to better understand the potential sources of noncompliance, in this project I 
am refining this understanding of brokered noncompliance.  Yet, the research literature, 
my experience working in a legal clinic for ten years where I saw hundreds of taxpayers 
who filed incorrect tax returns that were prepared by practitioners, and the initial results 
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 See Kristina Murphy, Aggressive Tax Planning: Differentiating Those Playing the Game from Those 
Who Don’t, 25 Journal of Economic Psychology 307, 309 (2004) (noting that until recently compliance 
research failed to “consider the potential impact of tax agents in the compliance process.”). 
144
 See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of 
Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE (Jeffery Roth et al. eds., 1989); 
see also Margaret McKerchar, Why Do Taxpayers Comply, TAX ADMIN. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 242 
(Walpole & Evans, Eds.) (2001).and Lin Mei Tan, Research on the Role of Tax Practitioners in Taxpayer 
Compliance: Identifying Some of the Gaps, TAXATION ISSUES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 15 
(2006) (citing to the utility of adapting the approach of Kidder McEwen). 
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 See Robert Kidder & Craig McEwen, Taxpaying Behavior in Social Context: A Tentative Typology of 
Tax Compliance and Noncompliance, in 2 TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE 48 (Jeffery Roth et al. eds., 1989). 
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 See Id. at 62. 
147
 See Kristina Murphy, Aggressive Tax Planning: Differentiating Those Playing the Game from Those 
Who Don’t, 25 Journal of Economic Psychology 307, 310 (2004) (noting after reviewing the literature that 
studies exploring the question of who instigates aggressive tax reporting have yielded contradictory 
results). 
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of focus group studies that TAS and I have conducted,148 suggested that crucial first 
steps in this inquiry include asking the fundamental question as to why a tax return that 
is prepared by a practitioner may be incorrect.149  
 
B. How Tax Return Preparers Can Contribute to Noncompliance 
 
Preparers likely contribute to noncompliance in different ways.  The following sets forth 
a listing of the number of ways practitioners likely contribute to returns that understate 
income or overstate applicable credits. 
 
1. Ignorance or misunderstanding of the law—poor training or education, 
inadequate attention to changes in the law, or complexity of the law; 
2. Misunderstanding or failing to understand or learn the facts—language or cultural 
barrier—can also be related to ignorance or misunderstanding of the law, as the 
practitioner may not know what information is relevant;150 
3. Unable or unwilling to detect false or incorrect information, though the 
unwillingness or inability is not reflective of failing to exercise due diligence; 
4. Facilitate noncompliance by not exercising appropriate due diligence to verify 
facts or information; 
5. Aid and abet in noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to misstate or omit 
income, or claim inappropriate or excessive deductions or credits; 
6. Facilitate continued noncompliance by advising taxpayers how to arrange affairs 
to minimize chances of detection, including advising taxpayers on practices or 
positions that are likely to generate IRS attention;151 
7. Directed noncompliance—working in an environment where there is a culture of 
noncompliance, either through insufficient quality control or active and affirmative 
exhortations to take affirmative steps which are meant to minimize liabilities or 
maximize refunds.152 
 
It is important to understand motivations for why brokers may intentionally or negligently 
facilitate taxpayer noncompliance.  Items four through seven may  arise from a 
perceived need to generate revenues from the activity (though taxpayers themselves 
get the lion’s share of benefits), retain clients, attract new clients, and for some 
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 The focus groups were conducted through out the summer of 2007, and involved a series of questions 
asked to practitioners that were meant to solicit their ideas about the role of preparers in noncompliance.  
In a later report, I will summarize and discuss the insights gleaned from the focus group sessions. 
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 By incorrect, I mean that the return is different from what the IRS would be legally owed by a taxpayer, 
assuming that the IRS and taxpayers share the same definition Marcello Bergman, Criminal Law and Tax 
Compliance in Argentina: Testing the Limits of Deterrence, 26 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law (1999). 
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 See A. Christensen, Evaluation of Tax Services: A client and preparer perspective, 14 The Journal of 
the American Taxation Association 60-87 (1992). 
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 See Stuart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash Businesses Tax Evasion 
Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, 5TH INT’L CONFERENCE ON TAX ADMIN. 164 (2002).  
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injunction suits brought in connection with activities undertaken by franchise offices of Jackson Hewitt.  
See U.S. Government Sues Jackson Hewitt Tax Preparation Franchises in Four States Alleging 
Pervasive Fraud (April 3, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/txdv07215.htm. 
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taxpayers (especially those seeking the EITC) position the firm or a business partner to 
benefit from the sale of refund generated products or services. 
 
C. Types of Preparers—how preparers interact with taxpayers intent on 
understating their tax liability 
 
 An essential part of my setting out a structure of noncompliance is a realization 
that some taxpayers come to practitioners with the intent of understating their taxes or 
maximizing their refunds.  Part B, above, considers the broader issues of errors on 
returns that are prepared by professional preparers, but within that broad category there 
is the particularly challenging issue of how preparers intersect with taxpayers who seek 
out practitioners to prepare and file erroneous returns that are noncompliant because 
the client is providing incomplete or inaccurate factual information to the preparer.153  An 
interesting area of study is how practitioners react to those taxpayers.  It is my 
hypothesis that practitioners who interact with those taxpayers intent on understating 
their taxes react in one of six ways: 
 
1. Refusing Practitioners: This preparer refuses to accept as clients those they 
know or suspect as dishonest or inappropriately aggressive (or terminate the 
relationship once they gain knowledge or reasonable belief); 
2. Signaling Practitioners: This preparer signals a refusal to prepare returns among 
those that they know or suspect are dishonest, through requesting back-up 
documentation or making detailed inquiries that contribute to the taxpayer’s 
understanding that the practitioner is unwilling to prepare such returns; 
3. Facilitating Practitioners: This preparer knows or has a reasonable suspicion that 
the taxpayer is misstating facts but facilitates noncompliance by advising taxpayers 
how to conceal or misstate income, or overstate or improperly generate deductions 
or credits; 
4. Indifferent practitioners: This preparer is indifferent to the taxpayer conduct but 
willing to follow taxpayer preference and overlook noncompliance in which the 
preparer knows or has a strong suspicion is present;  
5. Incompetent or Unsophisticated Preparers: Based upon what we would 
reasonably expect the practitioner to know given the practitioner’s due diligence 
requirements, this preparer should be able to understand that the taxpayer is more 
likely than not overstating his credits or understating his liability, but this preparer is 
unable to detect or suspect client misconduct for a variety of reasons, including a 
lack of training, education, or sophistication; and 
6. Reasonably Unknowing Practitioners: Despite the client conduct, the practitioner 
does not know and does not have sufficient basis to believe that the facts the client 
provides are incorrect. 
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 As mentioned in the literature survey, some research suggests that taxpayers seek out practitioners 
with like values to themselves, especially when taxpayers are intent on minimizing taxes through 
underreporting of income.  See Stuart Karlinsky & Joseph Bankman, Developing a Theory of Cash 
Businesses Tax Evasion Behavior and the Role of their Tax Preparers, 5TH INT’L CONFERENCE ON 
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There are some important policy questions that spin from understanding the above 
typology.  As some research indicates, there is some support for the notion that 
taxpayers will listen to practitioners’ advice about whether to comply with the tax 
laws.154  Likewise, there is evidence that suggested that taxpayers seek out tax advisors 
who generally match their attitudes towards tax compliance.155  It is possible, of course, 
that at least some taxpayers intent on improperly understating their income will seek out 
practitioners who will not make it difficult for them to noncomply, or file returns without 
the benefit of a preparer.  Yet, assuming that preparers have some gatekeeping156 role 
in the system, what can be done to push practitioners to become either type 1 or type 2 
practitioners and encourage taxpayers to visit type 1 or type 2 preparers?157  In addition, 
there are ways that the government can shift preparers from type 5 or type 6 preparers 
and generate possibilities for those preparers to become agents of compliance. 
 
D. EXAMPLE 
 
The following example applies the categorizations in sections B and C above.  The 
situation is complicated, of course, by the taxpayer’s role in the noncompliance, and the 
variety of motivations and scenarios that taxpayers present, but it illustrates the challenges 
that researchers must confront in addressing the dynamics of noncompliance in this area. 
 
Andrew, a 21 yr old single male lives in a one-bedroom apartment.  He works on 
the evening shift at a warehouse, which starts at 6:00 p.m.  His sister, Betty, is a 
single mom and has three kids: twin girls Debbie and Edna, age seven, and a 
three-year old boy, Frank.  Betty lives with her mother Caroline, in a modest house 
Caroline owns.  Betty has had a series of low-wage jobs, and has had substance 
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abuse issues.  In 2006 Betty and Andrew each earned $12,000.  Due to health 
issues, Caroline no longer works and receives Social Security disability income. 
 
Andrew is especially fond of Frank, and cares for the boy, often at his house.  He 
also has set up an area in his apartment where Frank can sleep over, which he 
often does on weekends. 
 
Betty’s friend Georgia is a hairdresser who also moonlights during tax season as a 
tax return preparer.  She prepares about 18 tax returns a year for friends in the 
neighborhood.  She charges $50 per return, and she does not sign the return as a 
paid preparer.  Georgia prepared Andrew’s tax returns.  2006 is the first year that 
Andrew filed a tax return.  Andrew filed as a head of household taxpayer, and 
claimed Frank as a dependent and qualifying child.  Note also Georgia prepared 
Betty’s return, and she filed as head of household, and claimed the twins as 
dependents and qualifying children for the EITC. 
 
The effect of this is significant.  If Andrew filed properly he would have taxable 
income of $3,550 and a tax liability of $358 (properly means filing single, without 
any dependents, qualifying children, or EITC).  By claiming Frank as a qualifying 
child he reduced his tax liability to zero and qualified for a $2,746 EITC, and $105 
Child Tax Credit.  The decision to allow Andrew to claim Frank does not affect 
Betty’s liability whatsoever, as with either two or three qualifying children she would 
be eligible for a $4,536 EITC and $105 Child Tax Credit.  Thus, this results in a 
shortfall to the fisc, of $3,209.158 
 
 
 What We Know About Andrew 
 
 As a legal matter, Andrew’s error as it relates to his ability to claim Frank as a 
qualifying child for the EITC is that he and the child flunk the residency test.159  In light of 
the IRS’s compliance studies, we know that failure to satisfy the residency test is the most 
common reason why people like Frank erroneously claim the EITC.160  We can identify a 
number of variables that may or may not be significant insofar as demonstrating a 
tendency that people like Frank would erroneously claim the EITC.  For example, we could 
examine his age and gender, his education, his use of an unenrolled preparer who 
prepared fewer than 25 returns; his sister’s having more than two children, his financial 
circumstances, and even his identification with society at large or affection for the 
government. 
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Assuming that we can identify variables that have a statistically significant relationship to 
the tendency of someone like Andrew to erroneously claim the EITC, consider, however, 
on reflection how difficult it is to identify the underlying reasons why Andrew improperly 
claimed Frank on his return.  Here are some, and I suspect that there are more, given the 
complexities of human behavior: 
 
Potential Reasons For Error 
 
1. Georgia attempted to maximize the refund for Andrew, with Andrew assuming that 
Georgia prepared the return properly and genuinely not knowing that the return was 
incorrect; 
2. Georgia attempted to maximize the refund for Andrew, with Andrew consenting to 
the approach after she explained what she was doing and why; 
3. Georgia improperly applied the law and thought that Andrew could treat Frank as a 
qualifying child;  
4. Georgia knew the law, but failed to or was not able to learn the appropriate facts so 
that she could properly prepare the tax return; and  
5. Andrew misstated facts to Georgia. 
  
From a researcher or policymaker’s standpoint, it would be helpful to know why Andrew 
filed an incorrect return.  What to do about the error should depend on whether the error 
was inadvertent or intentional.  If intentional, it would be helpful to know whether the intent 
originated on the supply-side (i.e., from the preparer), or on the demand-side, (i.e., from 
the taxpayer).  If inadvertent, a researcher would want to know what contributed to the 
mistake; for example, was it a cultural or language gap between the preparer and the 
taxpayer, or was it a lack of interviewing skills, or a shortfall in knowledge of the tax laws.  
Once a deeper understanding emerged, at that point more quantitative research might 
shed insight about what was effective in reducing that particular type of error. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This report is an invitation to additional research and a call for a deeper understanding of 
the sources of errors on commercially-prepared returns.  With the growing importance and 
taxpayer use of practitioners, and continued interest in reducing the tax gap, it is inevitable 
that Congress and the IRS will look to practitioners’ role in the tax gap, and consider their 
role in improving compliance.  
 
In a subsequent report I will try to sharpen this focus and refine the practitioner-based 
typology further, postulate a theoretical context for legislative and administrative changes 
to assist in encouraging practitioners to act in a way that may encourage taxpayers to file 
correct tax returns, and make specific proposals that policymakers may wish to adopt or 
study further to test effectiveness.  In addition, I will integrate qualitative research in the 
form of focus group sessions that I have conducted with a series of enrolled practitioners 
at various IRS-sponsored tax forums, and develop mystery shopper scenarios that can 
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better capture the dynamics between differing commercial preparers and common 
taxpayer scenarios.   
 
 
 
